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A GAP BETWEEN PU BLIC AND PROFESSIONAL 
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(COMMON SENSE) AND ITS ENEMIES*
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From the beginning of Western thought, 
it is usual that the philosophers identify 
themselves and their knowledge as an 
opposite of other prestigious knowledge 
forms of their epoch and their society. A 
classic Greek philosopher distinguishes 
himself from poets and sophists; like-
wise, his modern colleagues distinguish 
themselves from the sciences, from lit-
erature, or they do so from the public 
forms of thinking, out of the strictly de-
fi ned academic sphere. This distinction is 
focused both on the diff erence between 
the knowledge forms with an emphasis 
on the uniqueness of philosophy, and on 
the declaration of the need of a special 
institutional network for philosophy. The 
planned contribution off ers a detailed 
case study about a trend in European 
philosophy that identifi es itself as an op-
posite of common sense. The fi rst sec-
tion of the analysis of this phenomenon 
is focussed on several German classics, 
especially on Hegel’s well-known argu-
mentation against the common sense, 
the role of the same concept in Kant’s 
thought, and the interpretation of the 
specialities of the German tradition of 
sensus communis in Gadamer’s Truth 
and Method. Hungarian specialities of 
the common sense tradition will be de-
tailed in the next section, with a com-
parison of the German and Hungarian 
cases. In the concluding section, we will 
describe the consequences of the dis-
tinction of professional philosophy from 
common sense, for the social role of phi-
losophy in general.
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“Oh my dear common sense!
What high rank did the Lord give you?”
(Erdélyi 1981: 43)
1. Introduction
 At fi rst, the picture of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s classic histori-
cal analysis of the role of sensus communis in the (mainly German) 
Geistesgeschichte will be outlined. This will be followed by a short over-
view of the history of the same concept in modern philosophy as a spe-
cial answer to a challenge of the changed structure of communication. 
Following that, it will be shown the usage of this concept by Hegel as 
a negative point of orientation for his philosophical self-identifi cation. 
Later, a concise history of the Hungarian tradition of common sense will 
be off ered. In the next section, János Erdélyi’s Hegelian attack against 
common sense will be demonstrated, in his The Present of the Inland 
Philosophy, formulated as a critique of Gusztáv Szontagh’s philosophy. 
In the end, Szontagh’s answer and the relevance of this debate today 
will be mentioned.
2. Central-European Tradition of Sensus Communis in Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s Interpretation
Gadamer has an inevitable role in the revival of the tradition of 
sensus communis within the framework of self-interpretation in the 
Geistesgeschichte. This concept has an eminent position amongst 
the guiding concepts of humanism just after the fundamental term of 
Bildung (culture), in the initial chapters of his Truth and Method. Al-
though Gadamer’s approach is based on a historical retrospection, his 
work cannot be considered as a work of history of philosophy; it was 
not the author’s aim either. It is interesting to read how he interprets 
the history of this tradition, as a narrative of submergence into unim-
portance, from a special German point of view of the post-war period. 
Although Gadamer speaks about the German tradition as an opposite 
of the example of “England and the Romance countries,” his ideas can 
be extended in this (and only in this) context to all the philosophical 
cultures east to the English-French model, including the Hungarian 
one. Consequently, Gadamer’s argumentation is important for the his-
tory of Hungarian philosophy, and as a theoretical and methodological 
background too. The core of the decline of this concept is based on the 
process of depoliticisation; he formulated it in the following form:
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Whereas even today in England and the Romance countries the con-
cept of the sensus communis is not just a critical slogan but a general 
civic quality, in Germany the followers of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson did 
not, even in the 18th century, take over the political and social element 
contained in sensus communis. The metaphysics of the schools and the 
popular philosophy of the 18th century – however much they studied and 
imitated the leading countries of the Enlightenment, England and France 
– could not assimilate an idea for which the social and political conditions 
were utterly lacking. The concept of sensus communis was taken over, but 
in being emptied of all political content it lost its genuine critical signifi -
cance. Sensus communis was understood as a purely theoretical faculty: 
theoretical judgment, parallel to moral consciousness (conscience) and 
taste. (Gadamer 2006: 24)
Within German culture, Gadamer sees the possibility of preserva-
tion of “critical signifi cance,” exclusively in the writings of the authors of 
Pietism. It is not by accident that in these years Gadamer was involved 
in research of the œuvre of Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702–1782). 
His study for the modern edition of this author’s Latin work on sensus 
communis was published between the fi rst and the second edition of 
his Truth and Method. Gadamer emphasizes the signifi cance of Pietism 
in the following way:
And yet there is one important exception: Pietism. It was important not 
only for a man of the world like Shaftesbury to delimit the claims of science 
– i.e., of demonstratio – against the »school« and to appeal to the sensus 
communis, but also for the preacher, who seeks to reach the hearts of his 
congregation. Thus the Swabian Pietist Oetinger explicitly relied on Shaft-
esbury’s defence of the sensus communis. (Gadamer 2006: 24)
Later he repeated and emphasized his idea of the diff erence be-
tween the depoliticised German common sense and the civic content 
of this concept in other countries in the preface for the second edition:
In Germany (which has always been pre-revolutionary) the tradition of 
aesthetic humanism remained vitally infl uential in the development of the 
modern conception of science. In other countries more political conscious-
ness may have entered into what is called the »humanities«, »lettres«: in 
short, everything formerly known as the humaniora. (Gadamer 2006: xxvi)
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According to Gadamer’s train of thought, this German restriction 
of the sensus communis achieved its top in Kant’s aesthetics. Kant’s 
concept is purely aesthetic, free from moral and political contents; and 
in this form is infl uential on later generations:
Similarly, when Shaftesbury took up the concept it was, as we have seen, 
also linked to the political and social tradition of humanism. The sen-
sus communis is an element of social and moral being. Even when this 
concept was associated with a polemical attack on metaphysics (as in 
Pietism and Scottish philosophy), it still retained its original critical func-
tion. By contrast, Kant’s version of this idea in his Critique of Judgment 
has quite a diff erent emphasis. There is no longer any systematic place 
for the concept’s basic moral sense. As we know, he developed his moral 
philosophy in explicit opposition to the doctrine of »moral feeling« that 
had been worked out in English philosophy. Thus he totally excluded the 
concept of sensus communis from moral philosophy. (Gadamer 2006: 29)
Gadamer interprets Kant’s concept of sensus communis, formu-
lated in § 40 of the Critique of Judgment as a kind of degradation, by 
the following words:
When, however, we are really concerned with the ability to grasp the par-
ticular as an instance of the universal, and we speak of sound under-
standing, then this is, according to Kant, something that is »common« 
in the truest sense of the word – i.e., it is »something to be found every-
where, but to possess it is by no means any merit or advantage«. The only 
signifi cance of this sound understanding is that it is a preliminary stage 
of cultivated and enlightened reason. It is active in an obscure kind of 
judgment called feeling, but it still judges according to concepts, »though 
commonly only according to obscurely imagined principles«, and it cer-
tainly cannot be considered a special »sense of community«. The univer-
sal logical use of judgment, which goes back to the sensus communis, 
contains no principle of its own. (Gadamer 2006: 30)
Later, he formulates the other side of Kant’s ideas, the public as-
pects of taste and a concept of sensus communis in the following way:
Thus when Kant calls taste the true common sense, he is no longer con-
sidering the great moral and political tradition of the concept of sensus 
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communis that we outlined above. Rather, he sees this idea as comprising 
two elements: fi rst, the universality of taste inasmuch as it is the result 
of the free play of all our cognitive powers and is not limited to a specifi c 
area like an external sense; second, the communal quality of taste, inas-
much as, according to Kant, it abstracts from all subjective, private condi-
tions such as attractiveness and emotion. (Gadamer 2006: 38)
Gadamer’s reading is plausible, because it is true that Kant identi-
fi es the common human understanding and the (aesthetical) power to 
judge, and in the well-known § 40, he also makes pejorative notes on 
the common (gemein and vulgar) human understanding, a.k.a. com-
mon sense. (Kant’s work will be quoted from a more modern English 
translation than the one used in the English version of Gadamer’s work.)
[This] common human understanding [gemeine Menschenverstand], 
which is merely man’s sound ([but] not yet cultivated) understanding, 
is regarded as the very least that we are entitled to expect from anyone 
who lays claim to the name of human being; and this is also why it enjoys 
the unfortunate honour of being called common sense (sensus commu-
nis), and this, indeed, in such a way that the word common [gemein] (not 
merely in our language. Where it is actually ambiguous, but in various oth-
ers as well) means the same as vulgar – i.e., something found everywhere, 
the possession of which involves no merit or superiority whatever.
Instead, we must [here] take sensus communis to mean the idea of a 
sense shared [by all of us], i.e., a power to judge that in refl ecting takes 
account (a priori), in our thought, of everyone else’s way of presenting 
[something], in order as it were to compare our own judgment with human 
reason in general and thus escape the illusion that arises from the ease of 
mistaking subjective and private conditions for objective ones, an illusion 
that would have a prejudicial infl uence on the judgment. (Kant 1987: 160)
Based on the same locus, Kant’s opinions can be interpreted in an-
other way, as well, diff erently from Gadamer’s reading. In this similarly 
plausible interpretation, Kant’s main endeavour is to clear the classic 
concept of sensus communis from several connotations of the com-
mon human understanding (gemeine Menschenverstand), and to em-
phasise the social connotations of this term. Kant’s formulation that 
common means here shared is able to remind us the political poten-
tial of the original term. If the common (gemein) human understand-
ing (Menschenverstand) means something vulgar, we should avoid the 
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usage of the German term and its equivalents in modern languages, 
and use the Latin term where the adjective communis does not have 
the pejorative connotation of gemein. In other words, we should save 
the gemeine Menschenverstand from its vulgarity and put it into the 
rank of sensus communis, including the social aspects of the later one. 
We can observe here not only the depoliticisation of the concept, but 
also the hidden preservation of its political aspect. It is symptomatic 
that 20th -century philosophers like Hannah Arendt, fi nd the core of the 
political philosophy in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. If they discovered 
the political content in Kant’s aesthetics, it must be covered earlier, at 
least, in a hidden form, probably in the context of the Kantian interpre-
tation of the tradition of the sensus communis.
Returning to Gadamer’s interpretation, and summarising his opin-
ions, the German tradition of sensus communis at fi rst restricted to the 
aesthetics, later its content become gradually more and more emp-
ty, and it evaporated in the end both in the philosophical scholarship 
and in the open sphere of the cultural discourse. Gadamer’s narrative 
is surprising in a way, because he off ers a detailed analysis of Hegel’s 
role, in other loci of his book. It is important that the previous chapter 
about culture (Bildung) is mainly based on Hegel’s interpretation of this 
concept and on his usage of this term. Hegel’s fi gure and his role in 
Gadamer’s masterpiece are important for us because the concept of 
common sense was an important negative point of orientation for him; 
he defi ned the characteristics of philosophical thinking against com-
mon sense. In his argumentation, the main German representatives of 
the tradition of sensus communis were the same fi gures who were dis-
cussed in Gadamer’s historical reconstruction in the same role; also, 
they are the authors of the German Popularphilosophie and Pietism. It 
seems that Hegel represents a defi nite gap in the history of the sensus 
communis; we can say that this term did not evaporate, but Hegel ex-
terminated it, at least, in professional philosophy. It is interesting that 
Hegel’s role in the extermination of sensus communis does not appear 
in Gadamer’s historical analysis. Hegel’s opinions on the sensus com-
munis and Gadamer’s several notes on the Hegelian philosophy will be 
discussed later, in a separate chapter; before that a summary of the 
modern history of the concept of sensus communis is due, but from a 
special point of view. In the following section, the modern history of this 
concept will be discussed in its communicational context; sociability 
as an element of the modern meaning of this term will be linked with 
the ideal typical target audience of the philosophers on common sense.
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3. The Modern Concept of Sensus Communis as Part of the Refl ection 
on the Structural Turn of Philosophical Communication
The revival of the concept of sensus communis in modern philoso-
phy cannot be understood without an analysis of the challenge concern-
ing the self-interpretation of philosophy, based on the structural turn of 
scholar communication. This structural turn is double; on the one hand, 
it is the change of Latin to modern national vernaculars; on the other, 
it is a change of institutional network. Philosophy leaves schools and 
appears in new forums, such as the columns of the newly-established 
scholar periodicals in national languages, meetings of foundations, so-
cieties, and saloons. Amongst these new institutions, academies have a 
distinguished role both as forums scholars can meet and as organisers 
and supporters of books’ and periodicals’ publication. (This function of 
the Hungarian Scholarly Society was defi nitely important.)
As for the interpretation of this new communicational situation of 
philosophy and its changing target audience, several theories appeared 
in the 18th century, amongst them well-known ideas of classics. In Ger-
man philosophy, the most familiar ones are Herder’s historical analy-
sis of the changing structure of Publicum in his Letters on Humanism, 
and Kant’s double twin-concepts. On the one hand, he distinguishes 
between private and public usage of reason, and philosophia in sensu 
scholastico and in sensu cosmopolitico, on the other. Both refl ections 
refer to the role of the philosopher, with a rethinking of the meaning 
and social role of philosophy itself. According to Herder, philosophers 
must consider the changing structure of their target audience when 
they are speaking to this audience, and off er a theoretical description 
of the change of its structure. However, Kant proclaims the liberty of 
the public usage of reason on the one hand, and he regards philoso-
phia in sensu cosmopolitico as an ideal of the philosophical thinking, on 
the other. However, as a professor of a German university, he used his 
reason for a kind of philosophia in sensu scholastico, based on a pri-
vate contract, at the same time. The situation described by his double 
twin-concepts is his own personal situation refl ecting both his strictly 
prescribed obligation as a professor and his liberty of publication of his 
works. However, this description is based on his personal experiences; 
the principle of philosophical thinking rooted in it is universal and fi ts 
his moral philosophy.
However, the fi rst theoretical answer to the communicational turn 
was the revival and reinterpretation of the term of sensus communis in 
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the 18th century, with complex prehistory and long reception. The an-
tique sources of this term are highly diverse in themselves, from Aristo-
tle’s common intellect (koinos nous) through the diff erent terms used 
in various periods and branches of the Stoics to the well-known Latin 
version formulated by Cicero, which is an interpretation in itself. The 
modern revival of this term is attached to the name of Shaftesbury, who 
was familiar with the philological details of the history of his chosen 
guide concept, both in Greek and in Latin, according to the testimony 
of his infl uential essay entitled Sensus Communis (Shaftesbury 1709), 
especially in the philological notes of its second edition (Shaftesbury 
1737). He quotes a locus of Juvenal when the Roman poet uses the 
term sensus communis (Sat. 8.v.73). Later, in his own interpretation of 
this concept, he emphasises the civic and social context, formulated in 
the following way:
Some of the most ingenious Commentators, however, interpret this very 
diff erently from what is generally apprehended. They make this Common 
Sense of the Poet’s, by a Greek Derivation, to signify Sense of Publick Weal, 
and of the Common Interest; Love of the Community or Society, Natural 
Aff ection, Humanity, Obligingness, or that sort of Civility which rises from 
a just Sense of the common Rights of Mankind, and the natural Equality 
there is amongst those of the same Species. (Shaftesbury 1709: 61)
The Greek Derivation does not refer in here either to a well-known 
term of the Aristotelian epistemology, or an expression of the Greek 
Stoics, but to a neologism of an author of the late Stoic philosophy, 
Marcus Antonius who was not a native Greek speaker. He uses this word 
to characterize his foster-father. It is symptomatic that modern trans-
lations can mirror its meaning only by long paraphrases. In the follow-
ing part the original term and two English translations will be quoted; 
the long one is a widespread version in the modern English scholarship, 
Casaubon’s version was known already in Shaftesbury’s lifetime:
ἡ κοινονοημοσύνη (Marcus Aurelius Imperator Ad se ipsum I. 16. 2.) “he 
considered himself no more than any other citizen;” (Thoughts of Mar-
cus Aurelius, translated by George Long.) “his moderate condescending 
to other men’s occasions as an ordinary man. (The Meditations of Marcus 
Aurelius, translated by Meric Casaubon.)
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Marcus Aurelius’ term is obscure in a way, and it was not in the 
core of the philosophical vocabulary at any time. For Shaftesbury, the 
terminological issues were clear, but he solves them elegantly, by a 
single philological note:
It may be objected possibly by some, particularly vers’d in the Philoso-
phy abovemention’d, that the κοίνος νοὺς, to which the Κοινονοημοσύνη 
seems to have relation, is of a diff erent meaning. But they will consid-
er withal how small the distinction was in that Philosophy, between the 
ὑπόληψις, and the vulgar αἴσθησις; how generally Passion was by those 
Philosophers brought under the Head of Opinion. (Shaftesbury 1737: 105)
Based on the train of thoughts and Shaftesbury’s attached philo-
logical notes, we can say that he searched an antique term with an au-
thority of a classic, which had cognitive, aesthetical and moral aspects 
together, but the most important connotation is a respect for others. 
We should consider the consequences of our acts upon others and we 
should respect others’ opinions in the formulation of our judgements. 
This sociability was not characteristic in the antique antecedents of 
this concept before Marcus Aurelius; in the classical antique episte-
mology, there is a cognitive human faculty that is common in every 
human being, but which appears and works individually. In the mod-
ern revival of this concept, the moral and social aspects form the core, 
a term is needed that can describe the thinking of the new audience 
of philosophy, recruited from educated persons, but which functions 
out of schools. In this new term, judgdements on truth, beautiful, and 
(moral) good are connected with each other, and they are character-
ised by public mentality. Humans of common sense are sensitive to the 
events of the community, including politics, and they are inclined to 
make judgements together, in a continuous and mutual refl ection upon 
the opinions of each other. This modern tradition of sensus communis 
become a dominant trend in the Scottish common sense school. With-
in a few decades, they developed the moral philosophy (Smith 1976), 
aesthetics (Blair 1783), and a synthesis (Reid 1785) of this school; and 
it always functioned as a public philosophy of Scottish and British intel-
lectual life.
This public, social aspect of the modern revival of sensus commu-
nis is emphasised in Gadamer’s classic interpretation as well:
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By sensus communis, according to Shaftesbury, the humanists under-
stood a sense of the common weal, but also »love of the community or 
society, natural aff ection, humanity, obligingness.« They adopt a term 
from Marcus Aurelius, koinonoemosune [koinonoēmosyne] – a most un-
usual and artifi cial word, confi rming that the concept of sensus commu-
nis does not originate with the Greek philosophers, but has the Stoical 
conception sounding in it like a harmonic. (Gadamer 2006: 22)
Later, in the Continental, mainly German, reception of the idea of 
sensus communis a gradual emergence of the aesthetical elements 
can be observed, that went as far as dominance and hegemony, in con-
nection with the appearance of aesthetics as a separate philosophical 
discipline, at fi rst in the German scholarship. It did not mean that the 
German followers of the English and Scottish masters have forgotten 
the public, social aspects. This trend of German philosophy was entitled 
Popularphilosophie, with a reference to the public aspects of the Latin 
term populus. The model of a well-known author of the Popularphil-
osophie, Johann August Ernesti was populus Romanus, the political 
community of the Roman citizens with suff rage, in the description 
of his own German ideal typical target audience (Ernesti, 1762: 153). 
However, this German intellectual community makes purely aestheti-
cal judgments, its model is a political community; consequently, on 
this aesthetical community, a would-be German political community 
can be based. There was an important terminological consequence of 
the new German context of the common sense tradition. It is trivial for 
English speakers that common sense is just the English version of sen-
sus communis; but the German equivalents can diff er from the original 
term, as it was demonstrated above in the quoted locus of Kant’s Cri-
tique of Judgment. Manfred Kuehn, in his monograph on the German 
reception of the Scottish common sense philosophy, exemplifi es the 
appearance of the German terms for the common sense by the œuvre 
of Johann Christian Lossius (1743–1813):
Thus, just like Beattie, he rejects a formal defi nition of common sense and 
proposes as the only possible alternative a nominal defi nition through an 
enumeration of the objects and characteristics of common sense. Again, 
just like Beattie, he begins his discussion with a consideration of the dif-
ferent sense of »common sense«: sensus communis, public sense, koi-
nonoemosyne, koinai doxai, etc. The only exception is that he also deals 
with the German gesunde Vernunft and its cognates. (Kuehn 1987:  96)
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Two years after the work referred in the abovementioned quota-
tion (Lossius 1775), Lossius published a separate German monograph 
on the gesunde Vernunft (Lossius 1777), and he was not alone with 
his German philosophical vocabulary. We can consider that at the time 
Kantian critical philosophy and Hegel’s early works appeared, German 
philosophical terminology contained several expressions of its own for 
the English common sense and the Latin sensus communis. From this 
point of view, the connection between the new German terms and their 
Latin and English models was not evident, and later the same situation 
occurred with the Hungarian equivalents that are partly mirror-words 
of the German vocabulary.
4. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Critique of Sensus Communis
Hegel opposes the speculation and the sound intellect as early as 
the creation of his fi rst serious philosophical work entitled The Diff er-
ence between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy. He de-
votes a separate chapter to this topic entitled relation of Speculation to 
Common Sense. His concrete opponent is Reinhold in here; and Hegel 
in his argumentation identifi es Reinhold’s opinions and the ideas of the 
German Popularphilosophie of the 18th century which was really based 
on the concept of common sense, inherited from the abovementioned 
Scottish tradition. A clear dichotomy emerged in here and a hierarchy 
of the speculation and the common sense that become characteristic 
in all of his œuvre:
For this reason, speculation understands sound intellect [gesunde Men-
schenverstand] well enough, but the sound intellect [gesunde Menschen-
verstand] cannot understand what speculation is doing. […] Common 
sense [gesunde Menschenverstand] cannot understand speculation; and 
what is more, it must come to hate speculation when it has experience of 
it; and, unless it is in the state of perfect indiff erence that security con-
fers, it is bound to detest and persecute it. (Hegel 1977a: 99–100)
Hegel’s terms for common sense, in accordance with the German 
philosophical vocabulary of his epoch, are gesunde Menschenverstand, 
gemeine Menschenverstand, or if the meaning is clear from the con-
text, Menschenverstand without adjectives. It should be noted here that 
these expressions emerged in the German reception of the Scottish 
common sense school, especially in the German Popularphilosophie, as 
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it was mentioned above in the case of Lossius, and one of them, geme-
ine Menschenverstand was used by Kant, as well. (The widespread Eng-
lish translation quoted above, creates further terminological problems 
when it uses two equivalents for gesunde Menschenverstand, namely 
sound intellect and common sense.) Consequently, Hegel in here at-
tacks in a way both the ideas and vocabulary of his opponent, Reinhold, 
and the ones whom he regarded Reinhold’s ancestors. We can fi nd the 
motif of common sense as a stubborn and anti-theoretical phenom-
enon; which will be signifi cant especially in the Hungarian reception of 
these Hegelian ideas:
In particular, ordinary common sense [gemeine Menschenverstand] is 
bound to see nothing but nullifi cation in those philosophical systems that 
satisfy the demand for the conscious identity by suspending dichotomy in 
such a way that one of the opposites is raised to be the absolute and the 
other nullifi ed. This is particularly off ensive if the culture of the time has 
already fi xed one of the opposites otherwise. […] Common sense [gesunde 
Menschenverstand] is stubborn; it stubbornly believes itself secure in the 
force of its inertia, believes the non-conscious secure in its primordial 
gravity and opposition to consciousness; believes matter secure against 
the diff erence that light brings into it just in order to reconstruct the dif-
ference into a new synthesis at a higher level. (Hegel 1977a: 101–102)
Later, in the preface to his early masterpiece entitled Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit, he opposes insight as the result of the theoretical thinking 
and the emotive approach to the aim of edifi cation, in the framework of 
the actual status of the self-conscious spirit in the process of historical 
development. The representatives of the emotive approach to him are 
partly the authors of the theoretical works of the early Romanticism, 
partly the German Popularphilosophie, and partly the religious enthu-
siasts of his age:
[A]t the stage which self-conscious Spirit has presently reached […] now 
demands from philosophy, not so much knowledge of what it is, as the 
recovery through its agency of that lost sense of solid and substantial 
being. Philosophy is to meet this need, not by opening up the fast-locked 
nature of substance, and raising this to self-consciousness, not by bring-
ing consciousness out of its chaos back to an order based on thought, 
nor to the simplicity of the Notion, but rather by running together what 
thought has put asunder, by suppressing the diff erentiations of the No-
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tion and restoring the feeling of essential being: in short, by providing 
edifi cation rather than insight. The ’beautiful’, the ’holy’, the ’eternal’, ’re-
ligion’, and ’love’ are the bait required to arouse the desire to bite; not the 
Notion, but ecstasy, not the cold march of necessity in the thing itself, but 
the ferment of enthusiasm, these are supposed to be what sustains and 
continually extends the wealth of substance. (Hegel 1977b: 4–5)
In his same work, Hegel returns to the topic of the roles and char-
acteristics of the common sense in details, based on this general de-
scription. For example, in the subchapter entitled Reason as Lawgiver, 
he explains that in the formulation of the moral laws common sense 
runs into a contradiction. In this special case, the relationship between 
theoretical thinking and common sense is the same as it was shown in 
general, in the Preface.
Later, in the introduction to his Lectures on the History of Philoso-
phy, in the subchapter entitled Philosophy Proper Distinguished from 
Popular Philosophy, he extended the term of a concrete trend of history 
of philosophy, i.e. German Popularphilosophie to a timeless concept of 
a method of thinking from Cicero through Pascal to the religious enthu-
siasts and mystics. In these quite diff erent authors the only common 
element is a concept of the common sense linked with moral sense. It 
is the same characteristic that excludes them from the narrow, Hege-
lian, concept of real philosophy. Hegel argues for their exclusion in the 
following way:
But the drawback that attaches to this Philosophy is that the ultimate 
appeal even in modern times is made to the fact that men are constituted 
such as they are by nature, and with this Cicero is very free. Here the moral 
instinct comes into question, only under the name of feeling […]. Feeling 
is fi rst of all laid hold of, then comes reasoning from what is given, but in 
these we can appeal to what is immediate only. Independent thought is 
certainly here advanced; the content too, is taken from, the self; but we 
must just as necessarily exclude this mode of thinking from Philosophy. 
(Hegel 1892: 93)
In conclusion, we can declare that the tradition of common sense 
is present in the whole of Hegel’s œuvre, as a negative point of his 
philosophical self-defi nition. In his opinion, the tradition built on this 
concept is a part constantly present in human culture as a sub-phil-
osophical level of thinking. He identifi es the common German expres-
24
sions for common sense with the long philosophical tradition of sensus 
communis and excludes both of them from his concept of philosophy. 
(As it was demonstrated above, Kant’s way was diff erent; he observed 
a diff erence between the meanings of gemeine Menschenverstand and 
sensus communis.) However, Hegel attacks both the terminology and 
the ideas of his opponents, and as it was mentioned above, it was not 
conscious; the German equivalents of the common sense introduced 
by his opponents were regarded by him as common German words out 
of the scholarly vocabulary of philosophy. Consequently, the problem of 
the diff erence between terminologies has not appeared in explicit form 
in this discourse, as opposed to the case of the Hungarian Hegelians as 
it will be discussed later.
As mentioned above, Gadamer’s historical interpretation did not 
touch Hegel’s role in the extermination of the concept of common 
sense from professional philosophy; however, he discusses Hegel’s 
ideas in detail on important loci of his masterpiece. At the end of this 
chapter, we must touch upon Gadamer’s two notes on Hegel relevant 
from the point of view of the relationship between Hegelianism and 
common sense. Gadamer’s fi rst guiding concept is Bildung (culture) 
that is described by him based on Hegel’s writings. In Gadamer’s inter-
pretation, the Hegelian concept of Bildung is linked with spirit as some-
thing beyond the immediate human knowledge:
Even in this description of practical Bildung by Hegel, one can recognize 
the basic character of the historical spirit: to reconcile itself with itself, 
to recognize oneself in other being. It becomes completely clear in the 
idea of theoretical Bildung, for to have a theoretical stance is, as such, al-
ready alienation, namely the demand that one »deal with something that 
is not immediate, something that is alien, with something that belongs 
to memory and to thought«. Theoretical Bildung leads beyond what man 
knows and experiences immediately. (Gadamer 2006: 12)
Later, in the last chapter, Gadamer discusses the historical mean-
ing of the term speculative in German philosophy that has an important 
role in Hegel’s thought as well. The essence of the content of this term, 
in his interpretation, is something opposite to the dogmatism of every-
day experience:
If we now use the word »speculative« as it was coined by philosophers 
around 1800 and say, for example, that someone has a speculative mind 
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or that a thought is rather speculative, behind this usage lays the notion 
of refl ection in a mirror. Speculative means the opposite of the dogma-
tism of everyday experience. A speculative person is someone who does 
not abandon himself directly to the tangibility of appearances or to the 
fi xed determinateness of the meant, but who is able to refl ect or – to put 
it in Hegelian terms – who sees that the »in-itself« is a »for-me«. (Ga-
damer 2006: 461 – 462)
Based on these loci, it can be concluded that Hegel’s thought is 
the opposite of any usage of common sense, in Gadamer’s interpreta-
tion, as well; however, here it is not the term common sense or a syn-
onym that is used. In other words, Gadamer considers Hegel’s thought 
as contrary to common sense, but he did not attribute signifi cance to 
Hegel’s explicit opinions concerning this concept. What is relevant to 
the topic of the present writing is that the motifs of immediate human 
knowledge and the dogmatism of everyday experience, as expressions 
linked with common sense in Hegel’s philosophy, will have a signifi -
cant role in the critique of the common sense written by the Hungarian 
Hegelians.
5. The Hungarian Tradition of Common Sense
The tradition of common sense emerged in two subsequent peri-
ods in the history of Hungarian thinking. In professional philosophy, it 
appeared within the framework of the Hungarian controversy on Kant 
(1792–1822), in József Rozgonyi’s works. Rozgonyi, based on his ed-
ucation in Utrecht and Oxford, was engaged in the Scottish common 
sense philosophy. He formulated his critique of Kant based directly on 
the opinions of the contemporary Scottish common sense philoso-
phers. However, his booklet was published in 1792, though it was writ-
ten earlier, before he could read Kant’s Critique of Judgment. It is inter-
esting that in his interpretation Kant and the Kantians identify common 
sense with vulgar thinking (sensus vulgi). Although he did read the Cri-
tique of Judgment, he attributes to Kant a real Kantian idea that be-
comes well-known based on the § 40 of the Critique of Judgment what 
was quoted earlier in the context of Gadamer’s historical interpretation:
If the Kantians meant common sense the same what the abovementioned 
Scottish philosophers do, e.g. Aristotle’s  , Cicero’s 
naturae iudicia, i.e. the immediately evident propositions, which are the 
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fundaments of every demonstration, […] by other words, principles, what 
can be neglected by words, but must be followed by the whole of life and 
by the constant rationality of the acting, and involuntary recognised; in 
this case I do not know who could neglect the common sense. […] The 
Kantians mean common sense the perception of the crowd, which per-
haps can be unreasonable. But the abovementioned excellent Scottish 
philosophers have never recognised the common sense in this meaning. 
In their discourse, the perception belongs both to the philosophers and to 
the crowd. (Rozgonyi 2017: 39)
Si quod Kantiani per sensum communem id, quod Scoti illi philosophi 
intelligant, v. g. Aristotelis κοιναι δόξαι, Ciceronis naturae iudicia seu 
propositiones immediate evidentes, quae fundamentum praebent omni 
demonstrationi, […] principia, quae si quis ore neget, toto vitae tenore et 
agendi rationi constanti vel invitus affi  rmare cogitur, nescio, qui possint 
cum reiicere? […] Kantiani per sensum communem sensum vulgi quan-
doque absurdum intelligunt. Sed tali signifi catu eximii illi Scoti sensum 
communem nunquam acceperunt. Sensus ille, de quo hi disputant, acque 
philosophorum ac vulgi est. (Rozgonyi 2017: 39)
In the same period within the academic sphere, the concept of 
common sense plays an important role in the fi eld of aesthetics which 
became an independent philosophical discipline at the same time. Al-
though it is a highly interesting and signifi cant fi eld of research, dis-
cussing it would be beyond the scope of the present paper. Recently a 
lot of fruitful research has been conducted in this fi eld, (for a represen-
tative volume of the recent results see Balogh–Fórizs 2018).
At the same time outside the academic sphere, in the realm of 
public thinking, despite the important role the German Popularphil-
osophie had in the transfer of ideas, direct contact with the Scottish 
tradition was constantly present, as well. For example, József Kármán’s 
articles often refer to German authors who were probably known to his 
target audience; however, the motto of his program for the reform of 
national culture is a paraphrase of the expressions in the Scottish En-
lightenment (politeness and refi nement; a nemzet csinosodása).
The second period of the emergence of common sense in Hun-
garian thought was parallel with the 19th-century Continental revival of 
the Scottish school signed by the new French translations of the most 
important authors. The two periods are not divided into two separate 
parts in Hungarian intellectual history; it was not a revival of a forgot-
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ten philosophy, just a rejuvenation of a continuously present system 
of ideas. It is symptomatic that an important debate in the Hungarian 
intellectual life of the Reform Era, entitled Age of Epic versus Age of 
Drama, was provoked by a book review of a new Hungarian version of an 
aesthetical work by the Scottish school (Blair 1838).
The author of this book review, Gusztáv Szontagh, is the same per-
son that was the target of János Erdélyi’s critique in his attack against 
the philosophical usage of common sense, in favour of a Hegelian self-
understanding of Hungarian philosophy (Szontagh 1839a). Szontagh’s 
position as an author is symptomatic as far as the consequences of the 
turn of the structure of scholarly communication are concerned. In his 
entire career, he acted as a public intellectual, not as a member of the 
education system. His lifeworld consisted of the Hungarian cultural and 
scholarly press that developed during his early career at the same time 
the Hungarian Scholarly Society was founded. (It is quite symptomatic, 
but accidentally his fi rst writing was published in the year the Hungar-
ian Scholarly Society – later renamed Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
– was founded). Later, the members of the Hungarian Academy of Sci-
ences off ered him the forum and infrastructural background needed to 
work, but not a livelihood. He received the current publications of the 
Academy and a certain amount of handwriting paper every year which 
was a signifi cant help at that time; also, he had the right to participate 
at the academic meetings and lectures which, in his lifetime, were not 
yet festive events but quite real scholar forums. A part of his rights and 
obligations was to evaluate the applications for various awards. He be-
came a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences with a regu-
lar income only several months before his death; as an intellectual, he 
earned his living by writing his entire career. At the beginning of his ca-
reer, there was a serious Hungarian scholar press, but his generation 
could remember the narrower circumstances of the previous period, 
and a signifi cant amount of Hungarian scholars’ works was still pub-
lished in Latin. Consequently, due to his personal position, he could un-
derstand the institutional and communicational background of the vivid 
intellectual life of the Hungarian Reform Era. The conscious refl ection 
on the real and ideal role of philosophy in the newly-established modern 
national culture is a characteristic feature of all 19th-century Hungarian 
philosophy, especially of Szontagh’s works. This is a consequence of the 
turn in the structure of scholarly communication. The Hungarian phi-
losophers’ aim is to transcend school philosophy and achieve philoso-
phia in sensu cosmopolitico; but they were writing in Hungarian when he 
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abandoned the Latin school of philosophy. The extension of the national 
audience of philosophy goes hand in hand with the loss of the aristo-
cratic, but working universality of the academic sphere. Although the 
paradox of this new situation was characteristic of the entire European 
philosophical life, it was clearly and thoroughly formulated in the small-
er national cultures of East-Central Europe, e.g. in the Hungarian one. 
When Szontagh tends to defi ne the role of philosophy and his role as a 
philosopher, he cannot avoid the question of his relationship with the 
national culture. The role of (Hungarian) philosophy is a theoretical cri-
tique of every phenomenon in the life of the nation, including economy, 
social changes, political events, opinions, and programs in his opinion, 
which fi ts his activity as a critic. Hungarian philosophy will be developed 
as a synthesis of these theoretical critiques; and philosophical critique 
has a fundamental role in the creation of the modern Hungarian culture, 
economy, and political community. In his philosophy, he is consistent 
with this program; his fi rst propylaeum about the possibilities and ideals 
of the Hungarian philosophical revival of his time is decidedly based on 
the texts of his book reviews published earlier (Szontagh 1839b). Based 
on the evidence of his second propylaeum, it is clear that his previous 
works aims to establish a social and political philosophy (Szontagh 
1843). The common sense tradition as a basis to defi ne the role of Hun-
garian philosophy and his own task was obvious to him because it was 
not unknown phenomenon in the Hungarian intellectual life; in addition 
to that, there was a Continental revival perceptible in the years of his 
intensive philosophical self-teaching; but the most important reason 
was that this philosophy fi tted well his role as a public intellectual who 
speaks philosophically about public aff airs to a national audience out-
side the academic sphere. Szontagh was not engaged to the Scottish 
school as Rozgonyi was in the previous generation; in particular, their 
relationship to Kantianism was diff erent. Szontagh’s thought was based 
on highly divergent sources. For example, in his memoirs, he expressed 
his negative opinion about the whole post-Kantian German philosophy; 
in his opinion, Fichte was not a good inheritor of Kant and he attributed a 
kind of obscurity to Schelling; he attacked Hegel’s philosophy especially 
that of the Hungarian Hegelians in published form only. The top of his 
Hegel-critique was the so-called Hegelian trial (1838–1842).
The personal background of Szontagh’s thought and his self-in-
terpretation is the philosophical understanding of the role of a public 
intellectual. It was clear for him that this role was not possible on the 
Hungarian scene in the previous generation (in his memoirs, Szontagh 
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illustrates this with Kazinczy, who almost went bankrupt because of his 
high post costs caused by Kazinczy personally organizing the forums 
for Hungarian culture; later Szontagh could earn a living writing for 
more developed forums.). His conscious refl ection on the structure of 
scholarly communication includes descriptions of the dangers of the 
creative intellectuals’ new lifeworld as well. An extended and autono-
mous sphere of cultural production creates a separate world made of 
words and paper as a simulacrum of the real world, and a scholar can 
easily lose his way in it. A modern intellectual can easily change reality 
with its description, or model, especially if the description is incarnated 
in written words, i.e. in a form of communication familiar to him. This 
new machinery of cultural production is a dominantly male world; con-
sequently, the alienation from reality appears at fi rst as a non-realistic 
image of the female characters in the fi ctional literature in Szontagh’s 
book reviews. Generally speaking, the author who lost his way in the 
paper-world of words cannot see the female face of reality. Another 
form of description of the same intellectual behaviour is a metaphor of 
illness based on personal experiences. According to this metaphor, the 
alienation in the paper-world causes somatic symptoms; it is the re-
fl ection of the objective reality onto the subjectivity of the intellectual. 
Szontagh gradually found the fi gure of the intellectual alienated in the 
world of mere words, in every sphere of praxis and theory. In his satiric 
short story, written in the last years of the Reform Era, he describes 
three typical (Hungarian) fi gures as fellow-travellers of the narrator on 
a journey in a dream. The fi rst one is a poet who exchanges reality with 
the world of his poems; the second one is a political speaker who mis-
takes his rhetoric for the political possibilities, and the third is a phi-
losopher who lost his way in his own terminology. The fellow-travellers 
remained in the dream when the narrator woke up because they fi t the 
world of dreams and not reality (Szontagh 1845). In Szontagh’s reviews 
of philosophical works, it is clear that in his view Hungarian Hegelians 
were typical examples of this trap intellectuals might fall into; they 
identify their automatized terminology with reality and they do not de-
scribe or interpret the reality itself. After the revolution, he concretises 
what he means by the alienation in the paper-world made of words in 
the context of controversy about early Hungarian history; and it is clear 
that this controversy is connected to the national self-critique that fol-
lowed the revolution (1850–1852). His critique is actually focused on 
several historians, but it can be extended to the Hegelian philosophy 
of history as well. In here, the alienation from the objective world and 
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the creation of a paper-world made of words means that not only do 
historians underestimate or neglect the data of archaeology, historical 
climatology, and geography as well as disregard the existing data on 
the culture of the Eurasian nomads, but they also create diffi  cult narra-
tives from rare written sources, eminently from single ethnonyms with 
obscure reading. It is interesting to quote at fi rst Szontagh’s memoirs 
written at the beginning of this controversy and after that cite his pub-
lished discussion paper. (His memoirs remained in manuscript and 
were published just a few years ago.) In his memoirs he writes generally 
about Hungarian scholars of his epoch, however, he illustrates his point 
with the specialists of early Hungarian history:
A lot of Hungarian scholars […] [c]ultivates a fi eld of research, but he does 
not cultivate the human in himself. He becomes a scholar, but his knowl-
edge is warped, because it does not make him an erudite man. He always 
sits in his study room and researches to gain the respect of his scholar-
peers. The continuous sitting and room air destroys his body; his stomach 
is bad, he has sleeping problems and nervous diseases, and in the end 
he falls into hypochondria. Sometimes it happens for a certain research, 
which cannot achieve their aim, like e.g. the explication of early Hungar-
ian history. He made all his life meaningless and miserable for nothing. 
Hungarians have Eastern blood; consequently, they can deeply submerge 
into their studies. A full submerge into a thought is the main requisite of 
wisdom amongst Eastern wise men. (Szontagh 2017)
In his discussion paper, the virtual world constructed from books 
and ideas guides us to the fairy tales of history. It is notable and quite 
rare in the Hungarian discourse of this epoch that both the Hungarian 
and the Slovakian speculations about the early history of these nations 
are evaluated using the same method, and scholars can become ex-
amples of the same dangerous collective illusion:
If my fellows, who formulated their opinions against me, did not submerge 
into the vortex of idealism i.e. fantasies, yet, because of their enthusiasm 
and fervency, it was caused by their inborn gumption, and not by their 
defi nite will. But they are going to be characterised by the feature of an 
armchair scholar, that is the implication in the fi ctional world of books 
and ideas. If they went far away in this path governed by the pure zeal; 
they can arrive to the mysterious fairyland where István Horvát and Kollár 
discovered so many Hungarians and Slovaks. (Szontagh 1851)
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Here it is enough to mention only István Horvát’s speculation 
about early Hungarian history; it is the identifi cation of the Scriptural 
Girgasits (Jos 3,10; 24,11) with the ancestors of the Hungarians. In the 
theology of history, the name of Girgasits is a quite common example 
of the power of the Lord of history who can cancel nations totally, only 
their mere names remains. In Ján Kollár’s poem, the sweetheart of the 
poet, a daughter of a Lutheran pastor of the Saale-valley in Upper-Sax-
ony appears as a descendant of the ancient Slavic tribes of this land 
who had really existed here many centuries ago; and she becomes the 
symbol of the possibility of the re-Slavisation of the local population 
based on the right of blood, following their Germanisation in the past 
centuries.
6. János Erdélyi’s Hegelian Attack against Common Sense
In the time of the Hegelian trial, Erdélyi was a participant of the 
same intellectual life of Pest as Szontagh; based on his aesthetical 
writings, Erdélyi was elected member of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences in the Department of Philosophy, and he attended the same 
scholarly meetings as Szontagh did. Surprisingly, he did not show any 
interest in the Hegelian philosophical controversies at this time. The 
Hegelian trial was over a few years before the revolution of 1848, and 
after that, in the post-revolutionary epoch, Hegel was forgotten every-
where in Europe. Under these circumstances, Erdélyi’s endeavour to 
reformulate Hungarian philosophy based on Hegel is unusual two de-
cades after the Hegelian trial, in a post-revolutionary period. When he 
formulates his critique of the Hungarian harmonistic philosophy and 
the usage of the concept of common sense in the middle of the 1850s, 
he was silently witnessing the Hegelian trial (1838–1842), and the 
abovementioned controversy on early Hungarian history (1850–1852). 
He correctly assesses that these controversies are the collisions of the 
same opinions in diff erent fi elds, and he is conscious of the signifi -
cance of the problem language poses within these arguments, both in 
terms of the lingual model of reality and that of the scholarly vocabu-
lary within these arguments. Based on these antecedents, he regards 
the new argument provoked by him as the retrial of the Hegelian trial, 
and in his argumentation, he focuses on the language and terminology 
of philosophy.
The fi rst eight chapters of János Erdélyi’s well-known work en-
titled Present of the Inland Philosophy was published on the columns 
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of Pesti Napló as a series of articles in 1856;  next year he published a 
completed version as a separate volume. One of his main opponents, 
János Hetényi died a few years before that (†1853), Szontagh died a 
year after the publication of Erdélyi’s work (†1858). Due to these bio-
graphical conditions, Erdélyi and Szontagh could not develop a detailed 
argument; it did not have a formal end: Szontagh refl ected on Erdélyi’s 
critique, Erdélyi formulated his reply, but revoked the manuscript after 
Szontagh’s death, and it was published as late as the 20th-century edi-
tion of Erdélyi’s works.
According to the interpretation formulated in Erdélyi’s work, the 
previous period in Hungarian philosophical life was dominated by the 
Hungarian harmonistic philosophy of János Hetényi and Gusztáv Szon-
tagh; the guiding concepts of this philosophy were usefulness in life, 
popular elocution and nationality, and all these three expressions were 
based on the concept of common sense and a philosophical tradition 
based on this idea. Erdélyi unveiled these guiding concepts as precon-
ceptions, erroneously formulated requirements of philosophy. In his 
opinion, the requirement of nationality fi ts the belles-lettres as a par-
ticular phenomenon of the culture that expresses emotions, but it is 
alien from philosophy which expresses the universality of thinking:
The principle of nationality is continuously strong in poetry, weaker in re-
ligion and utterly ceases later in philosophy. It is the teaching of cultural 
history, as well, that is actually an image of the human spirit manifested 
in the chain of events. (Erdélyi 1981)
He argues that the requirement of the usefulness in life is fulfi lled 
by thinking based on speculation rather than on common sense:
Spirit is useful in life, because it contains all the singularities, opposites 
and contradictions as hidden destroying and boiling, stating and negat-
ing elements because it is the way of becoming. This point is the top of 
speculation where all things are opposites or syntheses of the opposites. 
A purely distinctive thinking, frozen in its distinctions will never achieve 
these heights. Consequently, the common culture, the so-called common 
sense realizes »inconsequence« in its greatest men in every country but 
does not care about higher correspondences. (Erdélyi 1981)
As far as the present writing is concerned, the most important 
part in which the requirement of popular elocution is unveiled:
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I can see that people are afraid of the idealism concerning language and 
common sense. They defend language against science. I believe that on 
the level of the development where our popular philosophers are they do 
not need a precise terminology to explain their thoughts, and they can be 
satisfi ed by the service of the common language. (Erdélyi 1981)
The essence of Erdélyi’s statement is that the terminological 
norms of his opponents are contrary to the requirements of a profes-
sional vocabulary of philosophy. Against the root of every problem, 
common sense, as a possible starting-point of philosophical think-
ing, he off ers three arguments. The fi rst and the second one are linked 
to each other; he attributes to his opponents a usage of the concept 
of the common sense as contrary to the development of the human 
thinking; consequently, he derives every retrograde inclination, under-
development, contra-enlightened behaviour:
Why is preferable the continuous recommendation […] of something 
what does not need learning, just knowing, by common sense? Oh, my 
dear common sense! What high rank did the Lord give you? But, whether 
common sense can easily be compatible with superstition, ignorance, 
stagnancy, all the moral and material wrong, till the pest? (Erdélyi 1981)
His third argument is based on his interpretation of the history 
of philosophy. Erdélyi restricts the long tradition of common sense 
philosophy to the Scottish school, and describes it as an obsolete, 
anachronistic and mainly parochial phenomenon in Western thought. 
It is strange to read today his lines about the end of English philoso-
phy with Hume and the world-wide victory of Hegelianism if the reader 
is familiar with the philosophical circumstances of the time the text 
originated. From a special Hungarian point of view, it should be men-
tioned that several British philosophers from the post-Humean period 
were well-known in the Hungarian philosophy of the Hungarian Reform 
Era, amongst them Jeremiah Bentham was the most important one. 
(In his text, Erdélyi uses the ethnonyms ‘English,’ ‘Scottish’ and ‘Brit-
ish’ as synonyms; sometimes ‘the Scotsmen’ means the authors of the 
Scottish common sense school.)
In philosophy, common sense appeared one hundred years ago in Scot-
land in a short but eff ective role” (Erdélyi 1981), “The philosophy of com-
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mon sense emerged and declined suddenly. After Hume, who was scepti-
cal about empirical experiences and off ered a novelty for the progress 
of philosophy, we cannot speak about English philosophy from the point 
of view of history of philosophy. […] Both the Scottish school and Kant 
appeared after and against Hume; Scottish philosophy remained a local 
phenomenon, but Kantian philosophy occupied the world. (Erdélyi 1981)
 
Of course, in Erdélyi’s view, the ending point of the history of phi-
losophy is not Kant but Hegelianism. Every local philosophical culture 
must be developed to the level of this Hegelian end of philosophy; in 
the Hungarian case, an explicit Hungarian Hegelian philosophy must be 
evolved from the Hegelian content encoded in the structure of Hungar-
ian language. It can be demonstrated philologically as well that Erdé-
lyi’s train of thoughts is based on Hegel, but he uses a diff erent method 
here. According to Hegel, the tradition of common sense is a constant 
part of the history of human thinking on a low level, below philosophy. 
Erdélyi regards it as a phenomenon of a particular period of the history 
of philosophy, in his argumentation of the interpretation of common 
sense philosophy as obsolete and anachronistic. The most signifi cant 
diff erence is the emphasis of the role of language and the importance 
of the scholarly vocabulary in Erdélyi’s writing. He argues that the 
Hegelian statement that professional philosophy cannot be built on the 
concept of common sense, is linked to an utterance emerged in the 
Hungarian discourse, namely, that the language of the Hungarian com-
mon sense philosophers does not meet the requirements of scholarly 
(Hungarian) vocabulary of philosophy. This idea is not fi t for the whole 
of the tradition of the sensus communis as it appears in Hegel’s his-
tory of philosophy; e.g. it is hardly demonstrable that Cicero’s usage of 
the scholarly vocabulary of philosophy was oblivious and inaccurate. 
This direct connection of the requirements of a professional philosophy 
and a scholarly vocabulary is a characteristic of Erdélyi’s Hegelian ar-
gumentation, adapted to the Hungarian conditions. Its causes are the 
experiences of the Hungarian linguistic reform on the one hand, and his 
relationship to language that was radically diff erent from the ideas of 
his opponent, Gusztáv Szontagh, on the other.
7. Szontagh’s Answer
Diff erences of the approaches concerning Erdélyi’s and Szontagh’s 
language were never discussed explicitly. Szontagh’s refl ection on Er-
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délyi’s critique was not focused on the linguistic expression of philoso-
phy. (His article was entitled Hungarian Philosophy: Answer to János 
Erdélyi’s Work Entitled “Present of the Inland Philosophy”; see Szontagh 
1857.) At fi rst, he referred to Erdélyi’s notes about the Scottish common 
sense school as an obsolete and local phenomenon and as a root of the 
Hungarian common sense philosophers, e.g. Szontagh himself. In Szon-
tagh’s opinion, Erdélyi is a follower of an obsolete system of philosophy, 
he did not realise in his intellectual solitude at Sárospatak that Hegel’s 
philosophy died in Germany as well; consequently, it cannot constitute 
the foundation of any contemporary Hungarian philosophy that inclines 
to be in synchrony with the universal trends. The core of his argumen-
tation is to demonstrate the dichotomy between their approach of the 
essence and self-understanding of philosophy and their diff erent prin-
ciples concerning the role of human thinking and cognition. Erdélyi, in 
his argumentation for an ideal of philosophy as an academic discipline, 
regards human thinking and cognition as values in themselves, and he 
unwittingly separates them from social praxis. Szontagh’s approach is 
the opposite, he formulates in his last writing the embeddedness of hu-
man thinking in the activity quite clearly: “[A] philosopher does not think 
purely for the sake of thinking; on the contrary: a human is thinking and 
investigates the truth for the right acting” (Szontagh 1857).
Based on his previous works, it can be declared that he includes 
the right political acting in the concept of right acting. According to 
him, decisions and programs of the politicians on the one hand, and 
a philosophical critique of this political praxis, on the other, cannot be 
observed separately. From this point of view, we should reinterpret Ga-
damer’s opinions about the depoliticisation of common sense in the 
Central European tradition, at least, in the Hungarian case.
8. Conclusions
Does this ancient argument, swooned in its beginning, have any 
consequences or conclusions today? The signifi cance of this debate 
is based on the long survival of Erdélyi’s several topics in the modern 
discourse. At fi rst, the lack of the refl ections on Erdélyi’s solitude in the 
20th-century secondary literature is conspicuous. Erdélyi is alone with 
his Hegelian ideas in Europe, but he regards Hegel’s philosophy histori-
cally successful and triumphant. (His single possible Hegelian ally was 
Ľudovít Štúr; however, their national and political convictions were an-
tithetical. But Štúr died in January, 1856, before Erdélyi wrote his work.) 
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Although modern researchers were informed about the post-revolu-
tionary “Hegel-free” decades, for them Hegel was an inevitable start-
ing-point, again, whether they were part of a school of neo-idealism, 
or the Marxism that found its way back to its roots in German classic 
philosophy. Erdélyi’s demand of a professional and speculative philoso-
phy that was formulated contrary to the embeddedness in praxis was 
appropriate for the endeavour to establish a professional philosophy in 
the 20th century. For researchers of the ideological topics of the every-
day consciousness, everyday language and the like, in the Communist 
era, Erdélyi’s critique of the backwardness of common sense seemed to 
be familiar, as well.
Erdélyi’s most enduring topic was the development of the Hegelian 
idea of the dichotomy of emotion and cognition. In Erdélyi’s thought, it 
appears as the dichotomy of the belles-lettres which expresses partic-
ular emotions and philosophy which expresses universal thought, with 
the conclusion that belles-lettres can express nationality by particular 
emotions, but philosophy can be only universal. The consequence of 
this topic was the creation of a deep gap between the thinking about 
the political community called nation and the long oblivion of the pos-
sibility of a public philosophy embedded in and refl ected onto the social 
and political praxis.
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